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Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause Cases Illuminate
the Law of Democracy?
PAMELA S. KARLAN*
INTRODUCTION
Thirty-six years ago, then-Professor Robert Bork delivered a now-notorious Harris
Lecture here at Indiana University. Later published as Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems,1 it may be one of the most significant pieces of legal
scholarship ever written-not just because of its intrinsic interest and influence on
subsequent constitutional theory, but because of its categorical declaration that
"[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitily (sic]
political."2 Its stinging attack on such signature cases of the Warren Court as Griswold
v. Connecticut3 played a large part in galvanizing the successful opposition to later-
Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court.
The Reapportionment Cases were a target of Professor Bork's particular wrath. As
you will remember, these cases announced that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required state legislative districts to comply with the principle
of one person, one vote. "Chief Justice Warren's opinions in this series of cases,"
Professor Bork declared, "are remarkable for their inability to muster a single
respectable supporting argument. ' 4 Professor Bork claimed that this failure was
inevitable given the Court's claim that "the Constitution ha[d] made a value choice
about individuals"-namely, that all individuals were entitled to cast equally weighted
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School. This is a revised version of the Harris Lecture I delivered orally at Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington on February 16, 2007.
As with so much else in my work, the seeds of the argument here were planted by my
longtime colleague and inspiration, Jim Blacksher. His article, Majority BlackDistricts, Kiryas
Joel, and Other Challenges to American Nationalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 407 (1996), prompted
me to start thinking about the relationship between voting rights and religion cases. Over the
ensuing decade, the argument has benefited from a series of discussions with Viola Canales,
Sam Issacharoff, Nate Persily, Rick Pildes, Jane Schacter, and Kathleen Sullivan. I have also
presented versions of this argument at workshops, lectures, or colloquia at the law schools of
Emory, Northwestern, the University of Connecticut, the University of North Carolina, the
University of Texas, the University of Michigan, and Yale; each time, I received bracing
criticism, helpful suggestions, and great encouragement. I particularly appreciate the comments I
received from Mitch Berman, Jack Boger, Heather Gerken, Mark Greenberg, Don Herzog,
Dawn Johnsen, Bill Marshall, Richard Primus, David Rabban, Bob Weisberg, and the students
at Michigan, Texas, and Yale.
1. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L..J.
1(1971).
2. Id. at 20.
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives by
married couples).
4. Bork, supra note 1, at 18.
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
votes-rather than "deriv[ing voting] rights from governmental processes established
by the Constitution."5
That latter tack would have involved adjudicating the Reapportionment Cases not
under the Equal Protection Clause but under the Guarantee Clause, which states that
"the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican Form of
Government." 6 That clause, Professor Bork argued, does not impose a rigid
requirement of individual equality but could be read to prohibit using apportionments
that "permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate." 7 In
Professor Bork's view, the "requirements of a democratic process rather than.., the
rights of individuals" should serve as the sole constitutional constraint on states'
allocation of political power.
8
Now, I think Professor Bork was wrong in claiming that the Constitution expresses
no "value choices" about political equality. The historical progression of constitutional
amendments regarding the right to vote does just that.9 The Fifteenth Amendment
prohibited denial or abridgement of the right on account of race; the Nineteenth, on
account of sex; the Twenty-fourth, on account of failure to pay any poll tax (at least
with respect to federal elections); and the Twenty-sixth, on account of age (at least for
citizens over the age of eighteen). Each expanded the franchise to include groups
previously thought unworthy or incapable of engaging in responsible self-government:
blacks, women, poor people, and young adults. Together, they express a commitment
to political equality and equal dignity among citizens.
But Professor Bork was on to something in identifying the problem of approaching
structural problems through entirely individualistic solutions. Politics implicates a
broad range of constitutional values-from individual dignity to protection of minority
and dissenting viewpoints to recognizing the claims of voluntary associations to
preserving channels for change to avoiding capture of the state machinery by a single
faction. So if we look to the constitutional structure to give us guidance in resolving
thorny questions of political design-there's a reason Justice Frankfurter's image of
the "political thicket"' 0 has had such staying power-perhaps we need to look beyond
the Equal Protection Clause, and perhaps even beyond the clauses that explicitly treat
political design altogether.
5. Id. at 17.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For a more elaborate version of the argument that the Court
should have used the Guarantee Clause, see Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases:
Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2000).
7. Bork, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713,
753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
8. Id.
9. And the obscure and underenforced Reduction-of-Representation Clause in § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment involves the very sort of "sixth-grade arithmetic" that Justice Stewart
later caustically criticized one person, one vote for adopting in Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474, 510 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the apportionment of the legislative
body of a sovereign State, no less than the apportionment of a county government, is far too
subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of
sixth-grade arithmetic").
10. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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One of the key sentences in Reynolds v. Sims"I provides a possible point of
departure. "The right of suffrage," the Court explained, "can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." 12 Free exercise. The phrase, of course,
appears in the First Amendment of the Constitution. But it appears as part of a pair of
clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 13 Taken together, the religion clauses express a
rich view of the appropriate role of religion in political society.
Thirty years ago, in another landmark case in the law of politics, Buckley v. Valeo,
14
the Supreme Court tersely rejected the suggestion that the religion clauses could
provide a helpful analogy for resolving questions of political design as "patently
inapplicable."' 5 One might doubt, as Don Herzog remarked when I presented aversion
of this essay at the University of Michigan's Constitutional Law Workshop, that we
can gain much traction from using one often inconsistent, incoherent area of law (the
religion cases) to illuminate another often inconsistent, incoherent area (the politics
cases). But I think comparing the two lines of cases constitutes a useful thought
experiment that rests on a historically plausible connection between the two arenas.'
6
And so I argue that the analogy between cases under the religion clauses and cases
involving the law of democracy-and the places where the analogy breaks down-can
sharpen our understanding, particularly about how constitutional law deals with the
relationship among individuals, intermediary associations, and the state. To be sure,
seeing these connections does not provide a new, unified theory for adjudicating all
cases involving political arrangements. Rather, it simply provides a series of possibly
useful new lenses for thinking about some difficult problems.
Part I of this essay briefly identifies some key values underlying the religion
clauses: preventing state interference with individuals' choices about values, avoiding
the creation of an outsider class, and preventing capture and exploitation of the
machinery of government. I suggest that, at a relatively high level of generality, these
values underlie many of the key doctrines in the law of politics as well.
The remaining parts take up several issues in the law of democracy. Part II looks at
some issues regarding government regulation of political parties. Political parties adopt
a variety of rules regarding who can participate in their affairs as voters, as candidates,
or as party officials. One central question in the law of politics involves the extent to
which the First Amendment bars government intervention in a party's internal affairs.
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. Id. at 555. For demonstrations of the Court's reliance on this formulation, see, for
example, Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (per curiam); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
105 (2000) (per curiam); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 92.
16. For example, Philip Hamburger and Bernadette Meyler have each shown ways that the
concept of equal protection central to the Fourteenth Amendment and to many doctrines in the
law of democracy and the commitment to religious liberty that underlies the First Amendment
have informed one another. Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-
Century Debate About Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SuP. CT. REv. 295;
Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection ofFree Exercise: Two Approaches and TheirHistory,
47 B.C. L. REv. 275 (2006).
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This in turn can raise a more fundamental question: who is the party? I suggest that
some useful insight can be drawn from the Supreme Court's discussion of when
government can intervene in the internal affairs of a church. Here, the Court has drawn
a useful distinction between questions of doctrine, as to which government
intervention is entirely inappropriate, and questions that involve a church's invocation
of state power or benefits, which may be appropriate for judicial resolution.
Part III considers problems of legislative districting. Over the past fifteen years, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly confronted the questions of when race-conscious or
partisan redistricting goes beyond constitutional limits. Here, the Court's cases have
pointed in different directions. While the Court has been quite worried about the
potential "establishment" of race, it has essentially abdicated any responsibility for
policing the "establishment" of parties, and has failed to see ways in which its
districting jurisprudence fails requirements of neutrality.
Finally, Part IV returns briefly to the problem at issue in Buckley v. Valeo'7 itself:
public funding of political campaigns. Here, a central question is the extent to which
funding regimes simply benefit the parties whose legislators craft the financing
programs in the first place. I suggest that public financing programs can pose an
establishment-style threat, and that the religion-clause cases suggest one possible
solution: constructing such programs so that private choices, rather than government
decisions, determine how funds are allocated.
I. THE COMBINED MESSAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The relationship between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses has spawned
voluminous case law and scholarly literature. Much of this law and literature focuses18,,
either on the "internal tension" between the two clauses, or on whether there is "'play
in the joints' between them."' 9 While in particular cases the clauses might be
reconciled or chosen between on a variety of bases, it is possible to discern several key
values that underlie both.2°
First, both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses reflect a commitment to
individual free choice in the selection of values and an opposition to government
indoctrination. The clauses "embody an idea that was once considered radical: Free
people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to
constrain nor to direct." 21 To be sure, there is a two-way relationship between those
thoughts and government action: individuals' values often inform their political
choices, and the government policies that political activity produces can in turn
influence individuals' thoughts. Consider, for example, the way in which religious
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
18. E.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
19. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 669 (1970)).
20. I am particularly indebted to David Rabban's suggestions for how to formulate these
key values.
21. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,881-82 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("By enforcing the Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the individual conscience, not for
the prosecutor or bureaucrat."); see also, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985)
(identifying "the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various
Clauses in the First Amendment").
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faith influenced many participants in the civil rights movement, which achieved a
series of antidiscrimination laws that conveyed a powerful message regarding norms of
racial justice that no doubt changed some hearts and minds. At the very least, however,
the clauses reflect a commitment to the fluidity of such value formation: the
government cannot freeze certain values into place and compel individual adherence to
them.
Second, the religion clauses together reflect a view that the state should not be in
the business of creating outsiders who are "not full members of the political
community." 22 Thus, the clauses
not only.., protect the integrity of individual conscience in religious matters, but.
.. guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs
in on one side of religious debate; nothing does a better job of roiling society, a
point that needed no explanation to the descendants of English Puritans and
Cavaliers (or Massachusetts Puritans and Baptists). 23
Imposing burdens or denying or conveying government benefits because of an
individual's religion sends a powerful message regarding his status as a full citizen.
Finally, although this point emerges more clearly from the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the clauses reflect a view that sectarian groups should be prevented
from using state resources to benefit themselves and thereby enhance their competitive
position. A religion should gain adherents based on its intrinsic merits rather than
through the creation of state-subsidized incentives.
These general commitments inform the American law of politics as well. The First
Amendment's protections of free speech and freedom of association are designed,
among other things, to protect individual autonomy in the formation of political
values. More concretely, just as the First Amendment prohibits inquiring into whether
particular religious beliefs are "acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible,, 24
so too the amendment protects "the sanctity of individual choice in the electoral
context" 25: it prohibits the state from inquiring into the motives behind a voter's
decision to cast his or her ballot in a particular way.26 Here, too, individuals' value
choices are not completely independent of state action: we use elections to tally up our
preferences and to determine the future direction and structure of our government, but
existing arrangements powerfully influence our preferences and dramatically limit the
choices available to us.
27
22. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
23. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 876 (internal citations omitted).
24. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
25. Lawrence G. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin andCity ofEastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1421 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1981); S. Alameda
Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291,295 (9th Cir. 1970).
27. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1734 (1999) ("[Political] structures, which we often take for
granted, powerfully shape our sense of the politically possible and what the baseline for a purer
politics should be. Indeed, . . . our conception of what politics is shapes our views of how
politics should be regulated, but how politics has been regulated shapes our conception of what
2008]
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A variety of other doctrines in the law of democracy are designed to prevent the
creation of permanent political outsiders. The one group of American citizens who
continue to face significant formal disenfranchisement 28 are persons convicted of
various crimes, and part of the very justification for this practice is the way it
designates them as outsiders. 29 Otherwise, "'[f]encing out' from the franchise a sector
of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally
impermissible." 30 The requirement of decennial reapportionment-a byproduct of the
one person, one vote cases-at least forces the periodic reconsideration of existing
allocations of political power. Requirements for periodic elections themselves are
designed to prevent the phenomenon of "one man, one vote, one time."' 1 And the
second and third prongs of Carolene Products footnote four 32 seem to parallel the
Religion Clause's concerns both with the creation of outsiders and with capture and
exploitation of the machinery of the state to enhance a group's position in civil society.
They authorize judicial intervention when the challenged legislation either "restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation" or is "directed ... against discrete and insular minorities" as to
whom "prejudice. . .may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities."3
3
II. ORTHODOX BISHOPS AND REFORM REPUBLICANS
One central group of politics cases involves the question of who can participate in a
party's affairs. This question is complicated because political parties simultaneously
play two roles in the democratic ecosystem. On the one hand, parties are voluntary
associations whose members coalesce around a series of ideas about how government
should run and seek to gain power to implement those ideas. Parties, in this sense,
exist to shape the state. On the other hand, at least since the mid-nineteenth century
and the advent of government-supplied ballots-and even more so since the early
politics can be. It's reminiscent of M.C. Escher's famous drawing of two hands drawing each
other." (emphasis in original)).
Not only can political structures shape individuals' choices, they can also impede them
directly. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding the constitutionality of
Hawaii's ban on casting votes for write-in candidates).
28. Many citizens continue to face significant practical barriers to full and effective political
participation, ranging from restrictive registration practices to lack of access to polling places to
the use of electoral arrangements that dilute their votes. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF,
PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTUREOF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007).
29. Indeed, the decision to disenfranchise citizens who have violated the criminal law is
precisely designed to designate them as outsiders. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza,
Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM.
HuM. RTs. L. REv. 193,212 (2004); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 33-34 (providing a
bibliography of the extensive recent scholarship on offender disenfranchisement).
30. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,94 (1965).
31. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1405, 1465 (2007).
32. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
33. Id. For a discussion of the relationship between these two prongs and problems of vote
dilution and gerrymandering, see Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of
Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329 (2005).
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twentieth century, when many states required candidate nomination through
government-regulated primary elections-parties have been important cogs in the
governmental election machinery that serve a public function. And of course the
process is even more circular than this, for the parties-in-government, to borrow V.0.
Key's taxonomy, set the rules that the parties-in-the-electorate must play by.
34
The question whether parties can exclude citizens from joining in their activities
has a long pedigree, stretching back to the White Primary Cases.3 5 But rather than
rehash the now-happily resolved question whether a party can exclude voters on the
basis of race, let me turn to some more recent examples that pose a less clear-cut
version.
The Republican Party of Texas holds an annual convention at which various groups
operate exhibition booths. 36 In 1996, the Log Cabin Republicans of Texas, a group of
Republicans who support civil rights for gay men and lesbians, applied to run a
booth.31 After initially permitting the group to participate, the party's executive
director ultimately rejected the Log Cabin Republicans' application, apparently
because of the party's disapproval of the group's message. 38 The Log Cabin
Republicans brought a constitutional challenge (under Texas constitutional provisions
that mirror the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process
Clause) to their exclusion from the party's platform-crafting process.39
Also in 1996, the citizens of California adopted by initiative a statute providing for
a blanket primary.4° Voters were no longer required to register as members of a
political party in order to participate in that party's primary; instead, voters received a
ballot listing all the candidates seeking nomination for a particular office.4 1 A voter
could cast her vote for whichever individual candidate she preferred in each race; in
effect, the voter could participate in every party's primary, albeit for different offices,
by voting for a Republican candidate for governor, a Democratic candidate for state
assembly, and a Peace and Freedom Party candidate for Board of Equalization.42 The
candidate for each party who received the most votes cast for that office would be
denominated the party's standard-bearer in the general election.43 The initiative's
drafters promoted it as a measure to "'weaken' party 'hard-liners' and ease the way for
'moderate problem-solvers' 44 by creating primary electorates that were more
representative of the population at large. The California Democratic, Republican,
34. See generally ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 202-325.
35. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
36. See Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1997) (describing the events at
issue).
37. Id. at 87.
38. Id. at 88.
39. Id.
40. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (describing the California
statute).
41. Id. at 570.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
2008]
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Libertarian, and Peace and Freedom Parties brought a constitutional challenge to the
inclusion of non-party members in their nominating processes.45
Finally, consider the example of David Duke. 6 Duke, a controversial political
figure with a long history of white supremacist activity, sought the Republican Party's
presidential nomination in 1992.4 Pursuant to Georgia law, Max Cleland, a Democrat
who was then Georgia's Secretary of State, published a list of potential candidates to
appear on the ballot for the state's preferential primary election and Duke's name
appeared on that list as a Republican candidate.48 But pursuant to power given to them
under Georgia law, the Republican members of the presidential candidate selection
committee-the state party chairman and the state senate and house minority leaders-
struck Duke's name from the list.49 Duke and registered Republican voters who
supported his candidacy sued. 50
In the end, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of the Log Cabin
Republicans from the Texas state Republican convention, 51 the United States Supreme
Court struck down the inclusion of unaffiliated voters in California's primaries,52 and
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of David Duke from the Republican primary
ballot. 53 One way of summarizing the cases, then, is to say that the party won each
time. But in some sense that begs the question. Who is the party? The Log Cabin
Republicans, after all, were registered party members who wished to change the party
from the inside. Both David Duke and the voters who supported him claimed to be
Republicans, even if their views did not accord with the views of the Georgia party's
current leadership. 54 And a majority of registered Democrats and registered
Republicans-the party-in-the-electorate to borrow again from V.0. Key-voted in
favor of the blanket primary initiative, 55 only to be thwarted by party officials chosen
through dimly understood processes in which few party members had participated.
45. Id. at571.
46. See Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (1 th Cir. 1996) (describing the relevant events).
47. Id. at 1228.
48. Id. at 1228-29.
49. Id. at 1229. Under Georgia law, the Secretary of State takes initial responsibility for
listing candidates, and "each person designated by the Secretary of State as a presidential
candidate shall appear upon the ballot of the appropriate political party... unless all committee
members of the same political party or body as the candidate agree to delete such candidate's
name from the ballot." GA. CODE. ANN. § 21-2-193 (2007).
50. Duke, 87 F.3d at 1229.
51. Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. 1997).
52. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
53. Duke, 87 F.3d at 1228.
54. In fact, two of the three committee members-the senate and house minority leaders--
while they had been chosen by the party's legislators were in no sense chosen by the party's
membership, since they were elected solely by the voters living in their districts. And Georgia
Republicans who lived in districts that elected Democrats were unable even to participate
indirectly in selecting the Republican legislative leaders. See Duke, 87 F.3d at 1229.
55. See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing to "the
preference of almost 60% of California voters-including a majority of registered Democrats
and Republicans-for a blanket primary"); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 236
(1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that states may permissibly intervene to "protect the
general party membership against... minority control" by party officials).
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In thinking about this who-is-the-party question, it may be instructive to consider a
related question in the law of religion cases. When is the state in a position to referee a
claim among competing factions as to "who is the Church?" A leading case on this
question is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (Serbian Bishops).56
After he was deposed and defrocked by the Mother Church in then-Yugoslavia (where
politics have literally been balkanized, in contrast to the Supreme Court's hyperbolic
use of the term to refer to the creation of majority-black congressional districts in
North Carolina),57 the respondent brought suit in state court, challenging the church's
actions as procedurally and substantively defective under its own internal rules; in
turn, the church sought control over various property and assets.
58
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the bishop's treatment was arbitrary under its
reading of the Mother Church's "constitution and penal code" and that the diocesan
reorganization was invalid under its view of the constitutional relationship between the
Mother Church and the Diocese, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.5 9 In an opinion
by Justice Brennan, the Court held that it would violate the Free Exercise Clause for
civil courts "to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a
[hierarchical] church so as to decide religious law" in much the same manner as it
would violate the clause for courts to engage in "civil determination of religious
doctrine." 60 Nor should the legislature be permitted to intrude in internal church
governance "for the benefit of one segment., 61 The state simply should not intervene
to resolve internecine disputes over what is the true church and who are its leaders and
members. It cannot take sides in doctrinal disputes because "religious freedom
encompasses the 'power [of religious bodies] to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.'
62
In short, the Serbian Bishops case rejected "intrusion into a religious thicket, 63 as
incompatible with judicial neutrality. 64
In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the case was not simply a dispute
over internal church doctrine-that is, over what adherents to Serbian Orthodoxy
should believe.65 Rather, it was a dispute over tangible assets, including real property,
56. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
57. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (claiming that deliberately creating
majority nonwhite districts "may balkanize us into competing racial factions").
58. Serbian Bishops, 426 U.S. at 706-08.
59. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268 (III. 1975), rev'd, 426
U.S. 696 (1976).
60. Serbian Bishops, 426 U.S. at 709.
61. Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 121 (1952) (striking down a New York
statute that had awarded control over the New York property of the Russian Orthodox church to
an American group on the grounds that the patriarchate in Russia had become "a tool of the
Soviet Government").
62. Serbian Bishops, 426 U.S. at 721-22 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116) (alteration in
original).
63. Id. at719.
64. One way to think about the Court's holding is to see it as involving a full faith and
credit principle in which church authorities' decisions in internal church processes are treated as
dispositive in later civil litigation.
65. Serbian Bishops, 426 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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located within the State of Illinois. 66 Both sides had invoked the jurisdiction of the
state courts-the Bishop to regain his See (and therefore his control over the church's
assets within the state) and the church itself to establish its control over the assets. 6 7
Given this posture, courts should be "entitled to ask if the real Bishop of the
American-Canadian Diocese would please stand up." 68 Otherwise, they would be
forced to rely on a formality-"ecclesiastical paper title." 69 Indeed, even the Serbian
Bishops majority left open the possibility of "marginal civil court review" in cases
when churches "act in bad faith for secular purposes., 70 The majority just disagreed
that the property dispute was such a case, given the Church's own construction of its
internal rules.
7 1
What does the Serbian Bishops case tell us? On the one hand, if religious
associations are to control their own message-their doctrine-the government cannot
step in to take sides in an internal struggle over a church's identity. The Serbian
Orthodox Church itself was the product of schism; perhaps if dissidents disagree over
a church's course, they should leave and found their own association. At the same
time, complete state nonintervention is troubling for the reasons raised by Justice
Rehnquist's dissent: when the church participates in the secular world, it is in a
different position than when it is dealing entirely with matters of dogma.
Thinking about the political party cases in light of Serbian Bishops highlights a
similar difficulty in deciding whether to respect a political party's assertion of
autonomy from state control. What makes the political party cases tricky is precisely
the difficulty in drawing a line between a party's internal and public activities. In the
arena of religion, free exercise claims start from a baseline of no state regulation and
no state benefits: the Serbian Orthodox Church operated completely free of the state.
Thus, free exercise is a negative liberty: the government is not obligated to assist
affirmatively individuals or religious organizations-the church whose members
cannot afford a building cannot call on the government to construct one; the believers
whose religion demands a pilgrimage to a holy place cannot demand government-
provided transportation to get there; the adherent whose religion commands her to be
fruitful and multiply cannot call on the government to provide fertility treatments. By
contrast, at least when it comes to parties' selection of candidates for public office, the
baseline is not state noninvolvement-at least not if the state, as all states do today,
regulates the nomination processes and conditions the benefit of ballot access on
compliance with those regulations. As a result, parties' claims to noninterference differ
in a significant respect from churches' claims to noninterference in the selection of
their standard bearers.
In conducting primaries that entitle their candidates to preferential ballot access,
parties have invoked the jurisdiction of the state and received a substantial benefit.
Indeed, it is impossible to separate the party from the state, since it is the party-in-
government that has crafted the ballot access laws. Moreover, in most states,
redistricting is performed by elected officials-again, the party-in-government-who
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 713-14.
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craft districts designed to elect their adherents. Thus, "free exercise" cannot describe
what political parties are engaged in, at least insofar as they seek to exclude voters
from participating in their primaries, a "'crucial juncture"' in the electoral process. 72
Unlike other blocs of like-minded citizens, parties have agreed to perform a public
function integral to the electoral process: winnowing down the number of candidates
on the ballot in the general election to a manageable handful. That is why the Supreme
Court treated the Democratic Party as a state actor in Smith v. Allwright and rejected
the claim that the party's First Amendment associational rights permitted it to exclude
black voters.73
Although the concept of free exercise as protection from state interference with a
party's internal affairs thus cannot be directly translated into the electoral context, it
does have some traction when it comes to internal party governance. Seen through the
lens of Serbian Bishops, the outcome of the Log Cabin Republican case makes a fair
amount of sense. A party's decisions about its message have to be free from state
interference. A party's platform is its statement of faith, its dogma. Individuals are free
to adhere to the platform or not, but the platform is entirely an internal matter of party
governance and must be protected from state intervention. Indeed, the Supreme Court
took a similar position in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,
when it struck down a California statute that dictated the internal structure of parties'
governing bodies as a violation of their freedom of association.74
Duke v. Massey75 is a more complicated case because there the functions of
expressing the party's message and selecting the party's standard-bearer are firmly
linked. The very purpose of a primary election, after all, is to allow the party-in-the-
electorate to select the party's candidate. It undermines the primary election to have
party officials partially decide the outcome by eliminating candidates ahead of time on
the grounds of inauthenticity.
Finally, California Democratic Party v. Jones and other cases involving
participation in parties' primaries 76 raise yet another set of questions, especially when
blanket- or open-primary laws are adopted through popular initiatives in which large
numbers of party members participate and a majority supports such laws. To say that
"the party" has a First Amendment entitlement to exclude nonmembers from
participating in its nominating events surely makes sense. But if the party's members
and its leadership disagree, that disagreement can be resolved in favor of party leaders'
views only by deciding implicitly that the party's internal processes for resolving
disputes give this power to the leadership.
In the end, the special constitutional status of religious groups under the Religion
Clauses and political parties is clearly doing significant work. It is hard to imagine, for
example, that the Supreme Court would have decided Eu the same way had it involved
a different sort of nonprofit or corporation: almost certainly, California could have
required other corporations doing business within the state to elect their boards using
72. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (quoting Tashjian v.
Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986)).
73. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
74. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
75. 87 F.3d 1226 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
76. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005); Wash. State Republican Party v.
Washington, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 1373 (2007).
20081
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
particular procedures or to rotate their chairmanships among different constituencies.
Thus, it may be precisely because constitutional protection of political parties' and
churches' processes of formulating their messages is so important that they are
accorded special autonomy.
III. KIRYAS JOEL AND CuRIous DISTRICTS
As we saw in the preceding section, party governance cases become difficult to
view through a free exercise lens when they involve the party's public function of
conducting primary elections that are "an integral part of the election machinery.""7 It
makes little sense to talk about preventing state interference when the party is
performing a public function, and receiving an important public benefit-preferential
ballot access-for doing so. At that point, anti-establishment seems a more appropriate
perspective.
This is particularly true given a central fact about American elections: a significant
number are decided not on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, but in
party primaries. A critical reason for this phenomenon is the pervasive use of electoral
districts.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has faced a substantial number of constitutional
and statutory challenges to the configurations of legislative districts. In Shaw v. Reno78
and its progeny, the Court ratcheted up the level of judicial oversight over the
deliberate creation of majority nonwhite legislative districts, holding that when race is
the "predominant" factor explaining a district's configuration, the district can survive
only if it is narrowly tailored to comply with the Voting Rights Act's commands that
redistricting neither diminish nor dilute minority voting strength.79 In Vieth v.
Jubelirer80 and its progeny, the Court abandoned, at least for now, any real judicial
oversight regarding partisan gerrymandering.
It is easy-too easy in fact-to draw analogies between the Shaw cases and the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. First, consider the threshold question of
standing. In most areas of the law, plaintiffs must show a concrete, particularized
injury in order to invoke the federal court's jurisdiction. A "shared individuated right
to a Government that obeys the Constitution"8' or "a generally available grievance
about government"8 2 generally does not confer standing. The primary exception is in
Establishment Clause cases, where Flast v. Cohen8 3 recognized taxpayer standing: any
taxpayer can challenge government expenditures that allegedly violate the First
Amendment without showing that he suffered any injury "which sets him apart from
the citizenry at large."
8 4
77. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
78. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
79. See generally ISSACHAROFF ETAL., supra note 28, at 724-60 (discussing the Shaw cases
at length).
80. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
81. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
82. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992).
83. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
84. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881-82 (1983). Flast was significantly limited by the
Court's recent decision in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007)
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Similarly, the relaxed nature of Shaw standing requires only that the plaintiff be a
resident of the majority-nonwhite district she seeks to challenge. The Court does not
require that Shaw plaintiffs be white. 85 It does not require that Shaw plaintiffs allege
that their votes have been diluted. It does not require that Shaw plaintiffs allege that
they are deprived of adequate or equal post-electoral representation because of their
race. In fact, it requires no tangible voting-related injury at all, but only residence
within the district and an objection to the role that race played in the government's
decision on where to draw the lines.
Second, consider the nature of the harm at issue. In Establishment Clause cases
involving holiday displays and prayers at public school events, the Court has pointed
to the message sent by the government action. Government-sponsored prayer "conveys
a message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs,, 8 6 telling
"nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of thepolitical community,'
and . . . adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."
87
So, too, the Court has suggested, with Shaw cases:
The message that [race-conscious] districting sends to elected representatives is
equally pernicious. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the
perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that
group, rather than their constituency as a whole.
88
This is why Rick Pildes has described the Shaw cases as involving "expressive
harms.
,8 9
Third, consider how both the religious display cases and the Shaw cases share a
concern with appearance that produces an ultimately unsatisfying fact-intensive
jurisprudence. Compare two religious display cases involving creches, Lynch v.
Donnelly9" and County ofAllegheny v. A CL U.91 The former creche was permissible,
the latter not. Why? Well, in Lynch, the city's holiday display also contained
(holding that although Flast confers standing to challenge congressional appropriations in
support of religion, it does not confer standing to challenge executive-branch programs funded
by general appropriations).
85. In Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), the eponymous Al Vera, one of the plaintiffs
challenging the majority-Hispanic House District 29, was himself Hispanic. See Brief of State
Appellants on the Merits, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (Nos. 94-805, 94-806 & 94-988), 1995
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 438. The Court held that he had standing. Vera, 517 U.S. at 957.
Moreover, in Shaw itself, the plaintiffs omitted their race from the complaint entirely. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 638 (1993).
86. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
88. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
89. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts" and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483 (1993).
90. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
91. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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a Santa Claus house with a live Santa distributing candy; reindeer pulling Santa's
sleigh; a live 40-foot Christmas tree strung with lights; statues of carolers in old-
fashioned dress; candy-striped poles; a "talking" wishing well; a large banner
proclaiming "SEASONS GREETINGS"; a miniature "village" with several houses
and a church; and various "cut-out" figures, including those of a clown, a dancing
elephant, a robot, and a teddy bear.
92
There was so much going on that the display "negate[d] any message of endorsement"
of Christian beliefs that a creche might otherwise suggest.93 By contrast, in County of
Allegheny, the display was more tasteful and therefore more communicative: the
creche, whose manger had at its crest an angel bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in
Excelsis Deo," stood by itself on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse, the "most beautiful" and "most public" space in the building.94 It was
flanked by just a "floral frame," which "serves only to draw one's attention to the
message inside the frame. The floral decoration surrounding the creche contributes to,
rather than detracts from, the endorsement of religion conveyed by the creche."
95
The fact that the Shaw decisions virtually always included a set of maps along with
the decisions show how these cases too involve an almost aesthetic concern.96 In the
Shaw cases, the Court began its analysis by declaring that "we believe that
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter., 97 Ultimately, the Court
moved away from a test focused entirely on district shape toward a predominant
purpose test. As long as race did not predominate over such traditional principles as
compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivision boundaries, protection of
incumbents, and partisan considerations, the district would not trigger strict scrutiny.
In the North Carolina redistricting's final appearance before the Court, the Court
downplayed the evidentiary significance of a statement by one of the plan's drafters
that the plan "provides for a fair, geographic, racial and partisan balance throughout
the State of North Carolina," concluding that the reference to "racial balance" showed
only that the "legislature considered race, along with other partisan and geographic
factors. ' 98 As long as race is metaphorically accompanied by a dancing elephant of
partisanship-in the North Carolina case, actually a dancing donkey, since the
92. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 596 (citing Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.R.I.
1981), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
93. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). You can get almost the same result
by comparing the Court's split-the-difference decisions in the Ten Commandments cases.
Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding Texas's inclusion of a Ten
Commandments monument included among seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical
markers on the state capitol grounds) with McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)
(striking down a Ten Commandments plaque initially mounted alone on a county courthouse's
wall).
94. 492 U.S. at 579.
95. Id. at 599.
96. See generally Hampton Dellinger, Commentary, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome
Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1704 (1997).
97. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
98. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 253 (2001).
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challenged plan was crafted to aid Democrats-it sends no constitutionally
troublesome message. 99
For me, the striking thing about the Court's redistricting jurisprudence is how quick
it has been to confront the creation of majority nonwhite districts as a sort of
establishment of race, and how reluctant it has been to do anything about the far more
pernicious "establishment of party" achieved by partisan line-drawing. The partisan
gerrymandering cases are a far better illustration of the religious Establishment Clause
concern that a sect will somehow gain control over the government machinery and
extract subsidies from the public. The major parties, and not racial minorities, control
the redistricting process, and they use it to insulate themselves from competition.
A richer understanding of the religion cases would actually reinforce the criticism
of Shaw, for the Shaw principle suffers from the problem the Court identified in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, a case involving the
University of Virginia's policy of refusing to fund student publications that "primarily
promote[] or manifest[] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality."' 00 The university claimed that this policy did not constitute impermissible
viewpoint discrimination and further defended its refusal to fund a magazine with an
explicitly "Christian perspective" on the grounds that the denial was necessary to
avoid an Establishment Clause violation.'
0
'
The Court rejected both arguments. With respect to the question whether the ban
constituted viewpoint discrimination, the Court observed that religion provides "a
specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be
discussed and considered."' 1 2 The university's policy placed publications that adopted
a religious perspective in a distinctively disadvantaged position vis-A-vis all other
perspectives. And this disadvantage was not required by the Establishment Clause. To
the contrary, all that was required was neutrality-that is, treating Wide Awake: A
99. The parallels between the creche cases and the Shaw cases involve methodology as
well. Shaw presented a second-hand invocation of Justice Stewart's classic description of
obscenity-"I know it when I see it." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. 725, 755 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964))). This set the Court upon a roughly decade-long course of "Redrupping" congressional
districts. ("Redrupping" refers to the Court's practice, in the late 1960s, after its decision in
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), of summarily deciding obscenity cases without
issuing opinions setting out legal standards to govern future cases.) See Pamela S. Karlan, Still
Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 287, 288
(1996) (discussing the Shaw cases). As Mary Anne Case observes:
The Court has shifted its particularistic examination of individual cases in an area
for which it has been unable to articulate a workable test of general applicability
from the counting up of body parts and their distance from one another in dirty
movies to the counting up of elves and candy canes and their distance from the
creche in Establishment Clause cases involving use of public property for religious
holiday displays; it also now scrutinizes individually the shape of voting rights
districts as it used to scrutinize images on a screen.
Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion
Clauses?, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 325, 353 n. 114.
100. 515 U.S. 819, 823 (1995) (third alteration in original).
101. Id. at 827-28.
102. Id. at 831.
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Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia the same way the university treated
all other student publications.1
0 3
When we turn from questions of religion to issues of redistricting, we see a similar
issue of whether it really is neutral to exclude a distinctive point of view connected
with group membership. In politics, race is often a perspective around which voters
organize themselves. 104 If racial groups share political preferences, a pluralist political
system cannot categorically exclude them without sacrificing legitimacy. As the
Supreme Court explained in Hunter v. Erickson, "the State may no more disadvantage
any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it
may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another
of comparable size."' 10 5 An equal protection principle that treats voters who affiliate
politically along racial lines differently from voters who affiliate along other shared
characteristics imposes a kind of viewpoint discrimination that inverts the
constitutional commitments of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, limiting the
political aspirations of precisely that group-black Americans-whom the
amendments were originally intended to serve.
0 6
Ironically, the Court has applied the Establishment Clause directly to the problem
of districting, although only Justice Kennedy seems to have noticed the direct
connection. Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet10 7 involved a challenge to a
New York statute that created a new school district for the village of Kiryas Joel. The
village itself was a somewhat singular creation: using a state law of general
applicability, a community of Satmar Hasidim had managed to craft an entirely
homogeneous jurisdiction.'0 8 The village did not need a conventional public school
system, because the Hasidim wanted to send all their children to religious schools. 0 9
But the community had roughly a dozen students with special educational needs, and it
did not want to send those children to the larger public school system in the
surrounding community." 0 So it persuaded the state legislature to pass a special bill
permitting the creation of a Kiryas Joel school district, whose full-time student body
consisted of only forty students-twenty-seven of them Hasidim bused in from outside
the village. " I
In a fractured opinion, the Supreme Court held that the creation of the district
violated the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter noted the irregular way in which the
district had been created--condemning the "manipulation of the franchise for this
103. Id. at 845.
104. See generally Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL.
L. REv. 1201, 1217-20 (1996).
105. 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
106. Jim Blacksher developed this point in a particularly powerful and persuasive form, by
comparing the underpinnings of the Shaw cases to assumptions underlying Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 168 U.S. 537 (1896). James U.
Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39
How. L.J. 633 (1996).
107. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
108. Id. at 691.
109. Id.
110. Id. at692.
111. Id. at694.
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district."'112 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the judgment went further, explicitly
comparing the creation of a district along religious lines to the creation of the
constitutionally impermissible districts in Shaw: "In this respect, the Establishment
Clause mirrors the Equal Protection Clause.""
3
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, did
not address Justice Kennedy's invocation of Shaw directly, but its defense of the
Kiryas Joel school district stands in sharp contrast to those Justices' position in the
Shaw cases. Justice Scalia was quite comfortable with the idea of an all-Hasidic school
district, although he denied that the boundaries were religious: "On what basis," he
asked, "does Justice Souter conclude that it is the theological distinctiveness rather
than the cultural distinctiveness that was the basis for New York State's decision?
1 14
But if the Hasidim can be viewed as a cultural group---a community of interest-rather
than a religious (or even a racial' 1s) group, then why shouldn't black or Latino voters
be viewed similarly?1 16 Echoing Justice O'Connor's statement in Shaw that
"redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature
always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age,
economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic
factors" and that "[t]hat sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to
impermissible race discrimination,"' 1 7 Justice Scalia suggested that the plaintiffs
challenging Kiryas Joel should "have to show not only that legislators were aware that
religion caused the problems addressed, but also that the legislature's proposed
solution was motivated by a desire to disadvantage or benefit a religious group...
because of their religion."'1 
8
So what should we make of the Shaw cases as "establishment of race" cases once
we've looked at a real Establishment Clause case involving districting? The majority-
nonwhite legislative districts at issue in the Shaw cases are less troubling than the
Kiryas Joel school district-or the village of Kiryas Joel itself, for that matter-along
a variety of dimensions. First, they were not racially homogeneous; it has struck me as
beyond perverse for the Supreme Court to use phrases like "balkanization" and
"political apartheid" to refer to some of the most racially integrated districts in the
country.1 19 Second, they were created in a process of general applicability in which
minority voters used their political leverage in a fashion quite similar to the way all
sorts of other groups "pulled, hauled, and traded" to attain their political goals.
1 20
112. Id. at 698 (opinion ofSouter, J.).
113. Id. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 740 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615,617-18 (1987) (holding that for
purposes of a Reconstruction-era statute protecting individuals against racial discrimination that
Jews count as a racial group).
116. Would the Justices who object to race-conscious redistricting that benefits black
communities be mollified if the public discussion described those communities as comprising
members of (overwhelmingly black) African Methodist Episcopal churches instead?
117. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (emphasis in original).
118. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 741 (emphasis in original).
119. See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 92-93, 102-04 (discussing this issue).
120. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
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Finally, the ultimate goal of race-conscious districting is political integration of the
minority community in the legislative process, and not political separatism.
The real puzzle is why the Establishment Clause sensibility that seems to drive the
Court in the Shaw cases and Kiryas Joel has been so absent in the political
gerrymandering cases. Ironically, the cases have been so focused on the question of
identifying a constitutionally grounded, judicially manageable standard for
adjudicating whether seats are allocated fairly between the two major parties that the
question whether the system ought to be protecting both parties' incumbents has been
largely overlooked. The problem has been treated for so long as a kind of individual or
group rights/free exercise-type claim that its Establishment Clause flavor has been
missed. Rick Pildes recently noted that a central threat to democracy is the propensity
of governing parties arranging the political structure to thwart future challenge. 121 As
I've noted elsewhere, the American version of "'one man, one vote, one time' ... is
more subtle: we continue to have regularly scheduled elections, but elected officials
from both major parties unite to ensure that the election results are foreordained.' 122 A
political system that ordains its representatives, whether that ordination is religious or
entirely secular, is nonetheless troubling for many of the same reasons that a political
system that religiously ordained representatives controlled would be.
IV. VOUCHERS AND DOLLARS
Campaign finance is the area of the law of democracy that rests most explicitly on
First Amendment concerns-largely freedom of speech, but recently also a renewed
understanding of the implications for freedom of association. There's little need to add
a free exercise gloss.
But as the appellants in Buckley long ago asserted, the Establishment Clause can
provide a useful lens for thinking about one particular issue: the question of public
financing. The current system of federal financing for presidential campaigns-which
may be on the brink of practical extinction since every remotely realistic presidential
candidate seems poised to forswear it123--seems only to have entrenched the existing
parties, while doing little to reduce the impact of private money. It gives the two major
parties millions of dollars to run their conventions and their general election
campaigns, while relegating any other candidates to the potential for receiving funds
retrospectively, if they manage to poll substantial numbers of votes. Despite the
presence of public funds, private funds continue to flow in and around the public
financing regime.124
The central problem with most public finance regimes is that the decision of how
much money to give, and to whom, creates competing risks. On the one hand, it would
be wasteful and pointless to give money to candidates who are unlikely to garner
significant support even if they have the resources to inform voters about their
121. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 28 (2004).
122. Samuel Issacharoff& Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 571-72 (2004).
123. See Eliza Newlin Camey, The Death ofPublic Financing, NAT'L J., June 16, 2007, at 34
(reporting on the decisions by leading candidates to opt out of the system).
124. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 450-51.
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positions. On the other hand, providing funds only to candidates from parties that have
an established track record further cements those parties' already advantaged positions.
Giving unto whomsoever much has already been given thus carries a real risk of
political establishment.
Perhaps one group of Establishment Clause cases points to a possible solution. The
Supreme Court has generally held that direct subsidies to religious institutions, such as
parochial schools, violate the Establishment Clause. But in cases like Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind125 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,126
the Court has distinguished programs in which private individuals, rather than the
government, determine the distribution of funds.
Witters, for example, involved a state vocational rehabilitation assistance program
that gave grants to individual visually disabled students to seek training in "the
professions, business or trades"; 127 the plaintiff sought funding to pursue his studies at
a private Christian college where he was preparing for a career "as a pastor,
missionary, or youth minister."' 128 The state agency denied his request, and the state
supreme court upheld the denial on the grounds that providing state financial
assistance "to enable someone to become a pastor, missionary, or church youth
director clearly has the primary effect of advancing religion" in violation of the
Establishment Clause.' 29 The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court concluded that, to the extent that the funds were "paid
directly to the student, who transmits [them] to the educational institution of his or her
choice[, a]ny aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to
religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients.' 30 Since Washington's statutory scheme was neutral, and "in
no way skewed towards religion," the Court refused to characterize it as "one of the
ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools that periodically reach this
Court" only to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.1 31 The Court went even further
in Zelman, which involved an Ohio program that gave tuition assistance grants to
parents in Cleveland to be used at any participating public or private school of the
parents' choosing.' 32 Although ninety-six percent of the students who used the
vouchers attended parochial schools, the Court still upheld the program, finding that
"government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals."
133
Some state- and local-level public financing schemes use a version of this
technique, providing public funds to candidates on the basis of the candidates having
demonstrated public support through raising small contributions from a wide donor
base. Or consider Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres' ambitious proposal for a federal
public financing regime using "Patriot dollars"-in which each voter would be given a
125. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
126. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
127. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
128. Id.
129. Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 56 (Wash. 1984) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)), rev'd, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
130. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
131. Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).
133. Id. at 649.
2008]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
voucher for $50 (of which $10 would be allocated to House races, $15 to Senate races,
and $25 to the presidential election) that could be contributed to candidates, political
parties, or political activity committees. 134 One signal virtue of such plans is that they
leave to individual choice, rather than government decision making, the allocation of
funds, and the Ackerman-Ayres proposal in particular recognizes that many voters will
choose to rely on intermediaries to direct their funds. 35 To the extent that the voters,
rather than the parties-in-government, determine the amount and distribution of funds,
public financing systems raise fewer problems of entrenchment or establishment. Of
course, many such regimes do not eliminate the need for private money altogether,
since the private money serves as the triggering condition for receiving public money.
But the continued reliance on some level of private funding may be the lesser of two
evils.
CONCLUSION
In the Poetics, Aristotle tells us that "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of
metaphor.., since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars."' 36 , wouldn't go quite that far: it's got to be greater to be Roger Federer
or Helen Mirren or Robert Pinsky. But looking at problems in the law of politics as if
they were problems under the religion clauses can help us to sharpen our focus, and to
see why, to use the metaphor one last time, establishment concerns are every bit as
critical as free exercise ones in crafting constitutional rules to govern democratic
politics.
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135. For further discussion of the importance of reliance on intermediaries, see Pamela S.
Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 743, 752-
53 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of this point in Randall v. Sorrell, 126
S.Ct. 2479 (2006)).
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